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Abstract: Lead in large part by Charter 88 and the Scottish Constitutional Convention, the activities of the constitutional reform movement since the early 1990s have clearly helped to introduce new proportional voting systems into UK politics. Yet, at the same time, the Labour governments after 1997decisively rejected voting reform for the House of Commons and dragged out Lords reform to prevent any direct election of a second chamber. To explore how Charter 88 and other groups influenced this process I first examine and critique the conventional wisdom that the reform movement's influence had minimal influence, as expressed by Anthony King's 2007 book, The British Constitution. Second, to illuminate the processes that King leaves so obscure, I chart three critical games played largely inside the Labour party from 1994 to 2003: -the pre-election game that lead to Blair's initial pledge of a referendum on voting reform; -the 'new institutions' game that produced a welter of new proportional voting systems everywhere else but Westminster; and -the post-landslide game that lead to Labour reneging on the voting system referendum pledge, plus taking no action on Commons or Lords electoral reform. Despite these latter setbacks a large-scale transition of UK voting systems has already taken place. British voters are increasingly used to proportional representation and the defence of plurality rule is intellectually dead (as the weaknesses of King's analysis inadvertently demonstrate). So the overall story is one of unprecedented success for electoral reformers, of a piece with the ineluctable transition to complex multi-party systems across all the nations and regions of the UK.
Most commentators on the introduction of major electoral reforms as part of the radical constitutional re-foundation carried out by the first Blair government (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) have been defeated by the curious and paradoxical way in which change was accomplished. Apparently radical innovations were implemented in voting systems for new institutions at the same time as the UK electoral and constitutional reform lobby suffered a major defeat, with Labour's unequivocal rejection of the Jenkins Commission report on voting reform at Westminster. The current literature, written by people close to the Labour and Conservative party elites, mostly contrives to suggest that nothing important changed (or changed for the better) as a result of Labour's reform spasm. 1 New solutions were conceded for unimportant institutions, but the Westminster core was full protected, maybe for decades ahead.
For instance, the historian Brian Harrison remarked prospectively in 1995:
'It remains difficult to see how the electoral system which could launch us into a multi-party system can now come about. The Conservatives oppose it, and if they do not constitute the largest party at the next election their successors in that position will have no interest in introducing it'. 2 Harrison correctly predicted Blair's and Labour's refusal to undertake any Commons reform. But he was also fundamentally wrong in claiming that 'there are some signs that we are well into a seventh phase' of what he apparently sees as a virtually indestructible two party system, a phase 'whereby two-party polarization resumes through the parties of the right and left competing to eat up the centre ground'. Instead
Britain has transitioned to multi-party politics at the same time as Westminster remained unreformed. Labour's internal debates elsewhere because they had detailed expertise and solutions to offer, which Labour's centrists in the end preferred to the ineffective, 'no change, no ideas' stance of the ultras.
THE IMPACT OF CHARTER 88 AND THE REFORM COALITION IN HELPING TO CHANGE UK VOTING SYSTEMS
For decades both Conservative and Labour elites have strongly believed in an interpretation of what they are doing called the 'Westminster model'. This is 'an element of the British political tradition which sees governing as a process conducted by a closed elite, constrained by an ethos of integrity with concern for the public good and contained within the framework of a balanced and self-adjusting constitution'. 4 In the most brazen fashion this model is used by governing elites to justify massive disproportionalities in the way that the UK voting system treats different parties. 5 The model also has many academic exponents who seek to rebut or marginalize criticisms of defects in UK governance, wherever possible. They generally deplore arguments for any systematic or rationalist programme of constitutional reform and deprecate any influence in practical politics that reformers seem to achieve. 6 Yet until recently this conventional wisdom has been rather silent or elusive on the subject of why and how so much constitutional reforms and especially voting systems changes have in fact been undertaken since 1997. Early treatments by journalists told a narrative of ministerial doings and manoeuvres, but largely ignored the political, cultural or other reasons why sweeping reforms were suddenly being considered. 7 Other early academic accounts also came mainly from lawyers uninterested in voting systems change, or electoral systems specialists focusing on some impacts of changes more than how they came about. 8 King also finds no space to mention any activities of other key voting reform groups, nor to reference any publications from them or media coverage they secured.
The process by which these groups in co-operation with Charter did so much to change public, media and politicians' opinions is left undiscussed. 'Several weeks before the 1997 election, a joint Labour-Liberal Democrat committee announced that the two parties had reached a firm agreement on the introduction of PR for European elections, and the committee's Labour chairman, Robin Cook, stated categorically that a new system would be introduced in time for the elections in 1999. However, Labour's manifesto published shortly afterwards, said only that the party had "long supported a proportional voting system for election to the European Parliament" and was silent on when such a system would be introduced'. Under first past the post, especially if there were a large number of mayoral candidates, almost anyone -an independent, a Green, a fascist, a Conservative, even a frightful Labour maverick like Ken Livingstone -might stand for election and be returned on a minority vote. Such an outcome was, if humanly possible, to be avoided. The government therefore hit upon the device of something called the 'supplementary vote'… [King then gives a three sentence description of the SV system]… It formed no part of the Blair government's calculations that the maverick Livingstone might win even under a system designed to ensure that nobody like him could possibly win; but, in the year 2000, fighting as an independent against an official Labour candidates, he did win -decisively'. 22 With the best will in the world it is hard to see this as anything more than a post hoc fairytale that King has invented to tide him over a sequence of events that he cannot explain and of whose actual course, actors and causal influences he apparently has no knowledge. There are a number of problems with King's account. Who exactly did the deciding is never made clear and nor is any intra-governmental process described. Key aspects of the Assembly and Mayoral set-up are not covered. And the decision is portrayed as quickly made, and transparently easy to decide.
The most significant aspects of the Greater London Assembly's final set up is that it has only 25 members, of which 14 are electing in large, multi-borough local constituencies, and 11 are elected London-wide using an AMS system. This set-up creates what could be a highly proportional at large election, but there is an additional legal threshold (unique in the UK) that requires parties to win 5 per cent of the London-wide vote (or a constituency seat) before becoming entitled to any list seats.
Naturally these details go completely unrecorded by King. Yet electing such a small assembly in fact raises completely different problems from those of the 129 member Scottish Parliament or the 60 member Welsh Assembly. 23 King's account of the origins of the Mayoral election system is also inadequate, because there is in fact no way of electing a single office-holder using AMS, STV or list PR, all of which require multi-seat constituencies before they can operate. In fact there are only three conceivably viable systems for this task -plurality rule, double ballots elections held a week apart (never seen as viable in because UK voters are highly unlikely to vote twice), and the Alternative Vote (AV) used in Australia, where voters number candidates in a preference order. The Supplementary Vote (SV) is a simplified form of AV that operates like an immediate double ballot election and rather closely fits the American label for AV, which is 'instant run-off'.
The fact that a highly proportional AMS solution was eventually chosen for the London Assembly and the Supplementary Vote for the mayoral election also reflected an extensive decision process involving actors not mentioned by King - To fit these various imperatives together GOL turned to academic consultants.
In their first report the consultants persuaded first the GOL civil servants and then Raynsford himself that a strong mayor could not be created with plurality rule elections. The Mayor's legitimacy would be much too low if there were many candidates and the winner secured only minority support -as they almost inevitably would in London (where historically around a fifth of votes are not cast for the Conservatives or Labour). Instead the consultants argued that an alternative multipreference system was needed that would maximize the number of voters whose ballots counted in electing the eventual mayor. Such a system would automatically tend to mean that moderate candidates drawing support across more than one party would win in London (as has indeed proved to be true since 2000).
The consultants also argued successfully that AV could only be used for the mayoral election in tandem with STV for the Assembly election, because both systems ask voters to number candidates -it would be too confusing to ask voters to use X balloting and candidate numbering on the same day. The consultants favoured AMS elections for the Assembly because they allowed X voting and so could also be 'We decided on the supplementary vote system: that is in effect, a system of improved first past the post. We did this because the Mayor will be in a unique position. Never before has so large an electorate voted for a single individual… The Mayor's authority will be enhanced by the fact that he will enjoy a broader base of support than might be achieved by first past the post alone. All this demonstrates our hostility to uniformity or symmetry for its own sake. easily accessible. 25 Its role in the policy process has also been well documented in official sources. 26 The main value of this mini-case study is to show that beneath the imputed certainties of high-level accounts like those of King and other conventional commentators, there is often an extremely complex 'bureaucratic politics' picture in which smaller events and the decisions and interactions of 'minor' actors can make a great deal of difference. 27 One fundamental dynamic shown in the London case seems completely absent from King's picture of decision-making at any stage. To secure voting system changes it is not enough to be in favour of proportional representation systems as a class. Instead reformers always had to offer a specific scheme of reform and to demonstrate that it could be feasibly implemented in ways that delivered superior results to plurality rule. So proposals for new voting systems or for reform of existing voting systems always centrally depended on having available a better specific method appropriately adapted for the particular institution being created or reformed.
Carrying over this key lesson into the broader discussion in the next part of the paper sheds important light on the different fundamental stages of the electoral reform 'game' inside the Labour party.
MODELLING LABOUR'S INTERNAL DEBATES ON VOTING REFORM
The basic set-up of electoral reform debates in modern Britain is one that makes the Figure 1 shows that Labour went into the general election split three ways, with the ultras playing no change, the reformists playing radical reform (albeit in a vague, unformed way), and the centre playing an intermediate stance. By declaring early the ultras avoided their bottom two preferences, but got the worst result attainable once they had ruled out embracing any change. The centre got their second-best outcome overall, while the reformist group got their best feasible outcome short of the ultras agreeing to look at some kind of reform for Westminster. regional level could be used to delivery 'broadly proportional' election results. 39 The
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Commission reported formally in autumn 1999 recommending a rather complex modified AMS system, using the Alternative Vote in local constituencies to enhance candidate choice there, and with a very small proportion of top-up seats at regional level, comprising less than a fifth of the total. This hybrid system was called 'AV+'
by the Commission; it was complex and hard to explain to the press or on television. 40 The Labour centre had meanwhile also cooled greatly on the idea of holding any referendum at all on the voting system, believing that it would disrupt the run-up to the next general election and attract little turnout. 41 With the Tory opposition in disarray and the government maintaining a comfortable opinion poll lead through its mid-term (when government fortunes usually slump) most Labour ministers' eyes were now set on securing a second term under plurality rule. Changing the system in a way that would make a second Labour overall majority very unlikely to happen was no longer a concern for Labour centrists -indeed for any but the most principled electoral reformers in Labour's ranks.
Responding to this change the ultras launched a pre-emptive strike against The electoral reform group now had little choice about accepting that Jenkins'
clearly intermediate proposal was the best they could realistically achieve, and the only system around which they could hope to rally. In theory they could have stuck to advocating a radical change (a fully proportional system), but without having any agreed scheme in view amongst many possible alternatives their chances were slim 37 The Northern Ireland elections worked on a completely different dynamic, responding to the province's sectarian politics. However, they were equally radicalwith a constitutional assembly assigning seats as of right to any party gaining 2 per cent of votes, and with a fully proportional STV system used to elect the first Assembly. The power-sharing, joint executive of all four main parties was also constituted by using a d'Hondt rule to set the order in which parties could take up ministerial posts, with the first minister going to the largest party, the equally important second minister to the party now the largest, and so on.
